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*Crim. L.R. 955  Summary: The age of the internet has thrown down some real 
challenges to the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Recently, the Government made changes to 
this piece of legislation, in an attempt to meet two of those challenges--the proliferation of 
“ Denial of Service”  (DoS) attacks, and the creation and dissemination of “ Hackers' tools” 
--and to fulfil international commitments on cybercrime. Yet some of these new measures 
invite criticisms of policy, form and content, and bring doubts about how easy to interpret, 
and how enforceable, they will be.   
Introduction   
Finally, after three aborted attempts to make changes to it within the last five years,1 the 
Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990 has been amended; specifically, both added to and 
altered.2 The offence of unauthorised access to computer material, 3 formerly a summary 
offence, has now become an offence triable either way, and the offence of unauthorised 
modification of computer material 4 has been replaced by the offence of unauthorised acts 
with intent to impair, or recklessness as to impairing, the operation of a computer etc. The 
time is right for a close re-examination of this piece of legislation.  
The CMA came into force on August 29, 1990. Soon after, the Court of Appeal delivered its 
judgment in Whiteley, 5 in which it found no difficulty in confirming a hacker's conviction 
under s.1 of the Criminal Damage Act (CDA) *Crim. L.R. 956  1971. That judgment 
undermined some of the claims put to, and made by, the Law Commission regarding the 
perceived inflexibility of the CDA 1971 in such scenarios.6 At the same time, it supported 
the arguments put in favour of simply amending the CDA 1971, or just leaving it be.7   
Perhaps, at that point, the UK Government should have adopted a holding position, from 
which it could have taken more time and care in deciding how to legislate on hacking and 
other forms of computer misuse. The law could have been developed in a sensible fashion 
by the judiciary, while rigorous, credible studies of computer misuse could have been 
conducted. The resulting evidence would have given a clearer picture of the problem and, 
crucially, been open to widespread critical scrutiny. In addition, as time passed, the 
Government's steep learning curve would have enabled it to legislate in anticipation of the 
cyberspatial explosion which would soon come. Instead, the CMA suffered a premature 
birth, which left it weak and vulnerable when the internet, as we know it, arrived.8   
The basis of the Act--system integrity   
Hacking9 can be viewed, inter alia, as invasion of privacy. However, in the United Kingdom, 
the criminal law has seldom been used in the protection of privacy.10 In this respect, the 
CMA was anomalous in a system where no general right of privacy is recognised by the 
criminal law. When the CMA arrived, some had already questioned why the unauthorised 
access of confidential information held on a computer should be an offence where if the 
same information were held on card index no offence would be committed.11   
Hacking has been seen as morally akin to breach of privacy, and legally akin to trespass.12 
Yet herein lies another anomaly. In English law, trespass is a civil wrong, a tort. It does not 
become a criminal offence without some further, aggravating feature. Yet the CMA did not 
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just criminalise hacking with intent to commit further offences. It also criminalised basic 
hacking--the computer equivalent of mere trespassory entry. In English law, neither words 
transmitted by electronic impulse, nor information--whether held within a computer or 
not--attain the status of property.13 The debate about whether the law should directly 
address the *Crim. L.R. 957  issue of “ information theft”  was ongoing when the CMA 
arrived14 and continues to run.15 However, in the late 1980s, both the English and Scottish 
Law Commissions left this area “ well alone” .16 The notion that criminal laws should be 
addressed to the concept of “ information”  and not confined to the integrity of the 
computer is a strong argument.17 Moreover, the concept of a legal regime for information 
which is not derived from analogy with rules for corporeal objects has much to recommend 
it.  
The conceptual basis of the CMA was, in fact, the protection of the integrity and security of 
computer systems. The Law Commission had concluded that “ the case for a criminal 
offence of basic hacking [did] not turn on the need to protect information” .18 It also took 
the view that “ clarification of the law”  was required concerning the destruction or 
alteration of information held within computers.19 Was this a lost opportunity for some 
creative legislative thinking? The Law Commission seemed loath to delve into the 
complexities of “ information law”  theory. The calls for patience and greater inquiry, in the 
search for a better strategy, seemed to fall on deaf ears.20 The truth is that the CMA offered 
the simplest route for law reform. It was a compromise between radical thought and 
minimal action.  
The miscreant insider   
The concept of “ authority”  remains the keystone of the Act. The access or modification 
(now “ impairment” 21 ) of programmes or data must be “ unauthorised” .22 If the accused 
was not entitled to control the process in question (access or modification/impairment), 
and did not have the consent of someone who was, the requisite lack of authority is 
established.23   
Back in 1989, as it ushered in the Act, the Law Commission declared that the basic hacking 
offence (in s.1) was mainly aimed at the “ remote”  hacker, but was also “ apt to cover the 
employee or insider as well” .24 However, it is submitted that the application of the Act to 
“ insiders”  has, at times, been confused and inconsistent. DPP v Bignell 25 provides a focus 
for such criticism. The facts were simple. Mr and Mrs Bignell were both police officers. On 
six occasions, they instructed computer operators to extract information from the Police 
National Computer (PNC) for *Crim. L.R. 958  them. They sought this information for 
private, unofficial purposes. The Police Commissioner had previously ruled that the PNC 
was to be used for police purposes only, and the Bignells knew this.26 When their 
convictions were quashed, the DPP appealed by way of case stated to the Divisional Court, 
but without success. The court distinguished the activity of “ breaking into computers”  
from the “ misuse of data” . It took the view that the Bignells had indulged in the latter.  
That decision invites strong criticism. The key issue was the true nature and extent of the 
authority which had been given to the defendants. The Divisional Court seemed adamant 
that the Bignells had authority to access the data in question, but that is debatable. 
Authorisation involves the giving of permission. That permission relates not only to the 
area of conduct but to the conduct itself within it. In his commentary on the Bignell case, 
J.C. Smith argued this same point by analogy: “ If I give you permission to enter my study 
for the purposes of reading my books, your entering to drink my sherry would surely be 
unauthorised ‘ access’  to the room as well as to the sherry” .27   
Two years later, in R. v Bow Street Magistrates' Court Ex p. Allison, 28 the House of Lords 
was presented with an opportunity to review the Bignell decision. Their Lordships dealt with 
some of the remaining issues, but ducked others. They rightly criticised the Divisional 
Court for posing a wrong question; its focus should have been on whether the Bignells had 
authority to access the actual data involved, not merely the kind of data in question. 
Despite this, their Lordships went on to conclude that the decision in Bignell was “ probably 
right” . Yet their stated reasons for this opinion were not wholly convincing. Lord Hobhouse 
declared that a “ possible view of the facts”  was that the access in this case was necessarily 
authorised because it was secured by the computer operators, who were authorised to 
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access the PNC in response to requests from police officers. But such focus upon the 
computer operators was implicitly misplaced. They were blissfully unaware of the real 
reason behind the Bignells' requests. In short, they were innocent agents. Some have 
stated that the doctrine of innocent agency was not applicable in this case,29 while others 
think that it certainly was.30 The latter opinion is the correct one. The fact that the 
computer operators lacked mens rea means that they should not have been viewed as 
participants in the alleged offences. In such circumstances, “ the Principal is the participant 
in the crime whose act is the most immediate cause of the innocent agent's act” .31 The 
Bignells fitted this description.  
Certainly, the Law Lords' judgment in Ex p. Allison supported convictions in cases where 
police officers had themselves accessed the PNC for unauthorised purposes, such as in 
Bonnett. 32 However, at the same time it denied support to convictions in cases where, like 
the Bignells, defendants had asked others to access the data in question for them, such as 
in Farquarson. 33 Given the doctrine of innocent agency, there is no sustainable distinction 
between such cases. It has been *Crim. L.R. 959  disappointing to see confusion and lack 
of clarity in the application of the crucial concept of “ authority” . This has somewhat 
undermined the Act.  
Claims about loopholes in the Act   
The very first prosecution under the CMA34 raised concerns that it might have been built on 
sand. The decision had seismic implications for the foundations of the Act. However, at the 
request of the Attorney-General,35 the Court of Appeal came to the Act's rescue by 
clarifying that it did not simply apply to “ remote”  hacking. In short, both direct and 
indirect unauthorised access would be caught in the legislative net. The decision in 
Bedworth 36 was dubbed by some a “ Hacker's Charter,” 37 the same label which had been 
attached to the influential, pre-Act case of Gold and Schifreen. 38 The truth is that this 
decision did not reveal a loophole in the Act. Rather, “ a loophole occurred in the application 
of the … Act” .39   
A more legitimate claim of a lacuna concerned the issue of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
These are launched against computer systems or networks to cause a loss of service to 
users, typically the loss of network connectivity by consuming the bandwidth of the victim 
network or by overloading its computational resources. They are not a new phenomenon.40 
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack poses a more potent threat. This is where 
large numbers of remote computers, which have been infected,41 are orchestrated to 
attack a target at the same time. These “ Botnet army”  manoeuvres have become very 
prevalent in recent times.42 They can be used to extort money from organisations,43 to 
further political protest,44 or even as a means of inter-governmental cyber-warfare.45   
There was considerable debate over whether the CMA covered such activities. However, it 
was said that the wide disparity in legal opinion was due to the fact *Crim. L.R. 960  that 
only the particular circumstances of each attack made it obvious whether the CMA wording 
applied.46 The decision at first instance in the case of Lennon 47 provided judicial 
confirmation of a gap in the law. There, it was successfully argued that an email 
bombardment,48 conducted by the disgruntled accused against the company from which he 
had recently been dismissed,49 could not be caught by s.3 of the CMA, on the basis that the 
recipient machine was designed to receive and respond to such email messages and, 
therefore, his sending of (all of) them was “ authorised” . That judgment was offered up as 
proof of the real need for reform of the CMA in this respect.50 This perceived weakness of 
the Act drew much criticism from the media.51 Such pressure contributed to the 
Government's recent decision to legislate further on the issue of DoS attacks. However, it 
is interesting to note that before these legislative changes were made, the decision in 
Lennon was successfully appealed by way of case stated. The Divisional Court remitted the 
case back to the District Judge on the basis that he had wrongly decided that there was no 
case to answer.52 However, ultimately, the defendant entered a guilty plea, and legal 
clarity remained elusive.  
Procedural difficulties   
Computer crime is substantially under-reported.53 There are a number of reasons for this. 
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First, corporate victims often wish to avoid the adverse publicity that could accompany a 
trial, much of which, in a sub judice situation, they could not fully rebut.54 For example, an 
online banking service would be loath to advertise an apparent security weakness, fearing 
substantial loss of custom overnight. Such a revelation might also attract further attacks. 
Consequently, there is a clear risk of further loss and no prospect of any direct, economic 
benefit in a prosecution under *Crim. L.R. 961  the CMA. Unlike a civil claim, it has no 
restitutional or compensatory element.55 Indeed, reporting a crime may lead to “ the 
consumption of much management time which could otherwise have helped make good the 
losses sustained” .56   
If a victim company simply craves “ justice”  and deterrence, it may still be dissuaded by 
the distinct possibility that the perpetrator will not be convicted.57 If the true culprit can be 
identified, the computer evidence could be subject to challenge in terms of its reliability, or 
could have self-destructed, damaging the system and leaving no admissible trace behind.58 
Difficulties might also arise where the offender sits in a country which does not have strong 
investigative, jurisdictional or extraditional links with the United Kingdom. According to the 
Confederation of British Industry, reasons such as these have, in the past, explained 
industry's ambivalence towards prosecuting those cases of computer crime which do come 
to light.59   
Much regret was expressed about the Law Commission's scant consideration of the 
evidential and procedural problems associated with the use of computers.60 Some 
computer-generated evidence can be difficult to obtain and/or difficult to adduce in court.61 
By its very nature, electronic data is vulnerable to destruction, deletion or modification. 
However, some legislative measures have been brought in to assist the task of gathering 
evidence.62   
The response of the police to computer crime has attracted regular criticism.63 Lack of 
funding, manpower and expertise remain weaknesses, notwithstanding the establishment 
of the National High Tech Crime Unit in April 2001.64 Many of the respondents to the All 
Party Internet Group (APIG) inquiry in 2004 complained that the police were not giving 
sufficient priority to the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. Indeed, it was pointed 
out that cybercrime was not one of the target measures by which police performance was 
assessed.65   
Rates of prosecution   
Despite the rise in computer misuse, there has been only a small number of prosecutions 
under the CMA. This is evidenced in the statistical information which *Crim. L.R. 962  the 
Home Office supplied to the APIG inquiry in 2004. During the period from 1990 to 2006, in 
England and Wales, 214 defendants were proceeded against at magistrates' courts under 
the CMA,66 and 161 were found guilty.67 Although there has been some criticism of 
seemingly low conviction rates in prosecutions concerned with the CMA,68 these figures 
show that the conviction rate in prosecutions where the principal offence with which the 
defendant was charged was a CMA offence (the aforementioned 214 prosecutions) is high 
(75 per cent). Yet criticism focusing on the overall lack of enforcement of the CMA is 
certainly not misplaced. Although the Law Commission stated that the justification for 
criminalising hacking lay in changing the climate of opinion, not necessarily in securing the 
conviction of a large number of individuals,69 it applied this reasoning to the basic hacking 
offence alone.70 Regarding the two, more serious offences, the law can only be a deterrent 
if it can be enforced effectively.71 Given this, the low rate of prosecution under the Act 
warrants criticism.  
Where convictions have been secured, the sentencing process has often come under fire.72 
Approximately two-thirds of s.1 convictions result in a non-custodial sentence.73 Certainly, 
great damage can be done through computer misuse. This is particularly true of virus and 
worm attacks on the internet.74 However, some commentators have doubted whether 
higher sentencing tariffs would significantly increase deterrence.75   
The role of computer and network security   
English criminal law is almost exclusively concerned with the conduct and culpability of the 
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offender.76 However, criminologists have long since recognised the role of the victim in the 
“ precipitation of crime” ,77 and criminals' reliance upon the ignorance or carelessness of 
their victims.78 It has been said that “ the optimal protection … in cyberspace is a mix 
between public law and private fences” .79 It is important to recognise computer and 
network security as a process, not a product. Technological measures such as properly 
configured firewalls, access control and *Crim. L.R. 963  secure authentication should be 
supported by rigorous procedures, together with the encryption of critical data in storage 
and transmission.80 In addition, detailed event logs and audit trails will help to provide 
cogent and admissible evidence for CMA prosecutions.81 In short, security plays a crucial, 
pervasive role in the fight against computer misuse.  
International initiatives on cybercrime   
Certainly, since the arrival of the internet several years after the CMA's enactment, the Act 
has been looked upon as a piece of cybercrime legislation. Proper definition begins with the 
recognition that cybercrimes are not simply related to computers; they are mediated by 
networked computers. Consequently, it has been argued that the term “ cybercrime”  
becomes far more meaningful when understood in terms of the transformations of acts by 
networked technology, rather than the acts themselves.82 It used to be the case that 
criminal law was mainly driven and shaped by national interests alone. The global, 
decentralised internet, and the transjurisdictional criminality which it facilitates, have 
forced changes to this historical position. There has been a broad recognition of the need 
for a co-ordinated fight against cybercrime, and three organisations have formed a 
vanguard in pursuit of a harmonised approach: the Group of Eight (G8),83 the Council of 
Europe,84 and the EU Council.85 It is within the context of these continuing international 
efforts that the recent changes to the CMA must be judged.  
Are the changes to the CMA welcome?   
Sections 35 and 36 of the Police and Justice Act (PJA) 2006 have changed ss.1 and 3 of the 
CMA. Section 35 transforms the summary offence in s.1 of the CMA into an offence triable 
either way. There are a number of reasons why this is a progressive move. It renders the 
offence extraditable, may increase deterrence through the raising of the sentencing tariff86 
and, in so doing, meets the requirement laid down in the EU's Framework Decision on 
attacks against information systems.87   
*Crim. L.R. 964  The Government accepted APIG's recommendation that further 
legislation be brought in to criminalise DoS attacks, conscious also of its commitments 
under both the Cybercrime Convention88 and the Framework Decision.89 Section 36 of the 
PJA 2006 has done this by replacing the original s.3 of the CMA offence of “ unauthorised 
modification”  with one of “ unauthorised impairment” .90 Now, neither erasure nor 
modification of data are required to attract criminal liability. This steers the section further 
away from the troublesome concept of criminal damage, taking a more pragmatic view of 
data processing in the 21st century. The new, improved s.3 offence “ shifts the locus of the 
crime from the ‘ contents of the computer’  to potentially any point in a network which is 
held to be ‘ in relation to’  the target computer” .91 However, it is worth noting that the 
Cybercrime Convention refers to the “ serious hindering”  of computer systems,92 and the 
Framework Decision to the “ serious hindering or interruption”  of information systems.93 
Yet the adjective “ serious”  does not feature within the new s.3 of the CMA. This casts a 
wider legislative net.  
A more radical change can be found within this new s.3. Initially, in the early part of its 
journey through Parliament, the section was set to criminalise only intentional impairment 
of computer systems. However, a startling amendment to it was made in July 2006 during 
the Committee Stage of the Bill, whereby an additional, alternative form of mens rea was 
added. The new offence can now be committed with a reckless state of mind,94 casting the 
net even wider. This extension of the criminal law to “ reckless impairment”  of computer 
systems could potentially muddy the interpretative waters and lead to some questionable 
attempts at prosecution. It seems anomalous to lessen the mens rea requirements for the 
new s.3 while neither the new s.1 nor the new offence in s.3A95 make mention of 
“ recklessness” . Moreover, both the Convention and the Framework Decision only call for 
an intentional state of mind to accompany such actions, as did the APIG inquiry.96 Yet this 
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radical change was made at a late stage, protected from the rigours of wider public scrutiny. 
This could prove to be a costly example of legislative overkill. With this criticism in mind, it 
is also worth noting that the maximum term of imprisonment after conviction on indictment 
for this new offence is 10 years, which is 5 years more than that of the old s.3 offence. 
Indeed, APIG had recommended both a basic and an aggravated form of the new offence, 
the former carrying a maximum term of just 6 months' imprisonment and the latter 
carrying only 5 years' imprisonment.97   
It is possible that the subjective concept of “ impairment”  could cause problems. It has 
been claimed that “ the threshold at which decline in system performance *Crim. L.R. 965  
crosses the boundary into ‘ impairment’  is likely to trouble the courts when considering the 
new section” .98 Equally, once a system is rectified, proving that the requisite amount of 
“ impairment”  has occurred, and establishing causal linkage to the accused, could present 
real evidential difficulties.  
Section 37 of the PJA 2006 has placed into the CMA a new offence of “ making, supplying 
or obtaining articles for use in computer misuse offences” .99 This meets the requirements 
of the Cybercrime Convention.100 It targets the creation, supply and use of so-called 
“ hackers' tools” .101 It is this measure which has caused the most controversy beyond the 
walls of the Palace of Westminster. Notably, APIG advised the Government not to legislate 
on this particular matter.102 The main problem stems from the fact that “ researchers in 
information security, penetration testers103 and other professionals in the field … may 
develop and make available such tools in the course of their study or business” .104 In short, 
these items are easily accessible and are widely used for legitimate purposes on a regular 
basis. It seems that the courts will be left with the difficult task of drawing the line of their 
illegal use.  
The mens rea requirements for the supplying offence within the section look flawed. People 
can attract liability where they supply, or offer to supply, such articles either intending 
them to be used to commit, or to assist in the commission of, an offence under either s.1 
or 3, or believing it likely they will be so used. In short, mere belief is sufficient. This could 
be problematic. For example, when will a supplier's general knowledge that password 
recovery tools can be used for criminal ends cross the requisite threshold of belief in a 
specific case? This may seldom be an easy question for either magistrates or jurors to 
answer. However, the Government was determined to have these less stringent mens rea 
requirements for this offence. They were added to the section via an amendment tabled by 
a (then) senior Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears MP. When addressing concerns 
expressed about the correct interpretation of the word “ likely”  within the newly changed 
section,105 she merely stated that “ the word ‘ likely’  is pretty well known in our legal 
system” .106 This was a woefully insufficient response, revealing either little knowledge of, 
or perhaps wilful blindness towards, the difficulties which the courts have faced in defining 
terms of mens rea and those related to them. Ironically, when the debate moved to the 
House of Lords, the governmental view of what the word “ likely”  should mean in this 
context varied. Initially, the Home Office had stated that it meant “ more likely than 
not” .107 Later, however, Lord Bassam of Brighton advised that “ [the word] ‘ likely’  reflects 
a belief that there is a strong possibility” .108 This lack of clarity fuelled criticism of the 
latterly inserted clause. The Earl of Northesk, a *Crim. L.R. 966  parliamentarian with real 
knowledge of computer and cyberspatial issues, called for its removal on the grounds that 
it was “ unnecessarily and dangerously broad” ,109 but to no avail. One thing was clear: the 
Government wanted suppliers to think carefully--at least once, if not twice--about the 
people to whom they might sell.  
Conclusion   
The 18 year history of the CMA has revealed its flaws. Problems have emerged with its 
provisions and their practical application within the courts. Some of these cracks can be 
traced back to the process of inquiry which ushered in the Act. The Law Commission's task 
was not an easy one. Its investigation into this challenging subject was hampered by a 
dearth of reliable information. This led the Commission to seek confidential counsel from a 
number of interested parties after the inquiry's consultation period had officially ended. 
These dialogues profoundly influenced the Commission, prompting some remarkable 
changes of its collective mind. Yet the evidence and advice given to the Commission during 
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these secret soundings, and the Commission's response to it, was not available for wider, 
public scrutiny. Add to this the pressure for action which the Law Commission seemed to be 
feeling from several sources, and the fissures run deep.  
The Act was born four years before the cyberspatial explosion that was delivered by the 
internet. This revolutionised many things, including computer misuse. Certainly, if the Law 
Commission's inquiry had been deferred to allow the collection of reliable statistical 
information on computer misuse, the lapse of time would have also delivered better 
foresight of the cybercriminal future. The CMA's main focus was on traditional hacking, an 
activity which has become something of a side show in the new millennium. Certainly, 
hackers can still pose a serious cybercriminal threat,110 but broadband technology has 
prompted change within the cybercrime agenda.111 Cybercriminals' engagement with 
victims is now more automated and asymmetric. New and more potent cybercrimes 
continue to emerge, their potency derived either from refinement or blending. For example, 
DoS attacks have been refined into DDoS attacks, launched by “ Botnet armies”  of 
computers which have been forcibly conscripted after falling victim to “ blended 
threats” .112 Some of the recent amendments to the CMA are attempting to respond to such 
developments.  
It is important to remember that law is but one of the “ four modalities of constraint” 113 
which can be used to regulate cyberspace.114 The digital realists claim that “ more than law 
alone enables legal values, and law alone cannot guarantee them” .115 The governments of 
many nation states have used those *Crim. L.R. 967  modalities of constraint to effect 
significant control over cyberspatial activities within their territories. The predictions that 
the internet would be an unregulatable “ forum without gatekeepers” 116 were wrong. The 
talk is now of the “ bordered Internet” .117 Yet this does not imply that global rules no longer 
have their place. On the contrary, it has been reiterated recently that “ the cybercrime 
problem seems to require a global solution--international laws that prohibit computer 
invasions and disruptions, and that establish standards for international cooperation to 
redress the problem” .118 In short, co-operation and harmony bring strength; international 
initiatives must continue to play a leading role.  
The law, both national and international, legitimises the use of a range of techniques in the 
fight against cybercrime by “ casting its shadow”  over those other combative efforts.119 Yet 
law which is outdated or simply difficult to enforce can fall into disrepute. The relatively 
small number of prosecutions under the CMA 1990 bears testament to this. For now, the 
Government has chosen to make amendments to this piece of legislation, both to address 
some of its perceived weaknesses and to meet international commitments on cybercrime. 
However, it is unlikely that the debate on “ information law”  will be defused by deferral. In 
the interim, the changes which the PJA 2006 has brought to the CMA 1990 will somewhat 
improve the chances of catching and convicting cybercriminals, and for this reason should 
be welcomed. However, the new provisions will also bring some problems of their own. A 
combination of some short-sighted, or simply stubborn, policy-making and some forceful 
government amendment during the Bill's passage through Parliament has produced certain 
provisions120 which invite controversy, could sometimes prove difficult to interpret or 
enforce, and may lead to claims of legislative overkill.  
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